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Pauline Ethics
Congregations as Communities of Moral Deliberation
David Fredrickson
Introduction
A founder and nurturer of congregations, St. Paul thought and wrote about 
moral matters for these same congregations. Recent interpreters have shown 
that the apostle's ethical statements were shaped to fit the needs and circum­
stances of the particular group of believers to whom he was writing. This 
chapter does not seek coherence in various moral topics in Paul's letters and 
then apply his views as guidelines for individuals.1 Nor does it focus on the 
specific cultural and historical identities of the congregations he was address­
ing. Instead 1 will draw out ethical significance from the fact that Paul placed 
congregations at the very center of his thought. In this approach congrega­
tions are neither obstacles to the reconstruction of coherent moral opinions 
nor the passive recipients of already worked out answers. Rather they are 
places where moral reflection, formulation, and action occur. Pauline ethics 
grow out of the apostle's vision of the church as persons gathered and empow­
ered for moral deliberation by the Spirit in the name of Jesus.
Why is Paul's ethical thought a pertinent topic in a book on Lutheran 
ethics? One reason is that many Lutheran ethicists have appealed to Paul's 
writings as an authoritative source for such key teachings as Christian free­
dom, justification by grace through faith, and vocation. Ethics is Lutheran, it 
is claimed, if the individual believer is motivated for good works through the 
forgiveness of sin. Ethics speaks first about the individual before God and the 
conscience that has been freed from guilt. It has also been a Lutheran belief 
that God has structured the world and called individuals into roles, relation­
ships, or as Robert Benne has aptly put it, "places of responsibility." Paul's writ-
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ings have served as a biblical basis for this dual focus on individual motivation 
and the role of the individual in the orders of creation.2 Most Lutheran inter­
preters of Paul have appropriated him to legitimate this scheme of ethics.
Another reason to turn to Paul, and the one behind this essay, is the belief 
that Paul provides an alternative to that kind of Lutheran ethics. While not 
ignoring the issue of individual motivation for good works, my approach 
makes thematic the power of persons in community to influence their corpo­
rate lives and the world for good or for ill. Instead of assuming stable and 
meaningful structures into which individuals are called, this ethic explores the 
way humans use power to create structures that are sometimes beneficial and 
sometimes oppressive and destructive. The moral task that lies before the 
church is the testing of all things by those who must bear the consequences of 
the decisions reached. Taking up this task in the power of the Spirit, the 
church aligns itself with the reforming work of Martin Luther.**
My approach requires me to give more attention than is usual in the 
Lutheran appropriation of Paul to the political dimension of his thought. By 
"political" I mean to evoke the Greek city-state and its democratic procedures 
for decisionmaking.4 I will pursue the thesis that an adequate account of 
Pauline ethics must begin with the instructive parallel that exists between 
Paul's conceptualization of the local church and the assembly ( ekklesia)  of the 
Greek city. This parallel does not explain all of Paul's thinking about the 
church, but it does underscore that for Paul the chief ethical problem has to 
do with the kind of politics the church practices internally.
The three passages I examine (2 Cor. 3,- Phil. L27—2:18,- and Rom. 
12-15) are rich in political imagery for the internal actions of the congrega­
tion. 2 Cor. 3 and Rom. 12-15 also have theoretical treatments of the use of 
Scripture in the church, while Phil. 1:27—2:18 helps us understand Paul's 
appropriation of the theory of example in Greco-Roman moral philosophy. 
His commitment to the theory of example influences the way he uses 
Scripture. Furthermore his use of Scripture coordinates well with his under­
standing of the congregation as a democratic community.
Free Speech and the Letter/Spirit Distinction 
in 2 Corinthians 3
The political metaphor of the congregation as assembly shapes Paul's 
ecclesiology.5 This is most easily demonstrated in 2 Cor. 3, where we also 
encounter Paul's theory about the proper use of Scripture.
It is somewhat artificial to think of 2 Corinthians as Paul's discussion of 
Christian community. Paul is engaged in self-defense in which he gives an 
account of his ministry. Yet there is a connection between Paul's ministry and
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the community. Some within the Corinthian church have charged him with 
flattery and a lack of free speech (parresia). To answer this charge, Paul views 
his possessing free speech as dependent not upon his own moral virtue, as the 
philosophers did, nor upon his social standing, as did political theorists. 
Rather he uses much free speech (pollf, p am siq , chrometha 3:12) because of the 
Spirit. In 3:18 it is clear that the Spirit is the possession of all in the commu­
nity. The source of Paul's free speech and the free speech of his audience is the 
Spirit. Thus Paul's apology helps us understand the political dimension of his 
ecclesiology.
The Christian Congregation as Open and Inclusive Political 
Community. Because of its associations with ancient democracy, the term 
"free speech" (parresia) in 3:12 implies that Paul understands the congregation 
as analogous to the Greek assembly.6* The community of believers is a speak­
ing place, where the future of the community is determined through unhin­
dered conversation that seeks to arrive at consensus through persuasion. As we 
will see when examining another political term (politeuestbai) in Phil. 1:27, mod­
ern translators are usually deaf to the political overtones in Paul's language. 
They turn parresia into a subjective state, and the analogy between Pauline con­
gregation and democratic assembly disappears. The Revised Standard Version, 
New Revised Standard Version, and a host of commentators have encouraged 
an existentialist reading of Paul by taking this term out of its political setting 
and making it merely a matter of confidence.7
Free speech was in fact the heart of ancient democracy. It was the right of 
all to whom Greek cities granted citizenship and was the most effective means 
of preserving the city's freedom and safety. After Alexander's conquest, as the 
centers of decision making shifted away from cities to regional capitals, 
philosophers imagined free speech independently of waning city life. The 
good conscience based upon the wise man's virtue gave him confidence to 
speak the truth no matter what the personal risk. Free speech also had an 
important role to play in friendship. Friends spoke the truth to one another to 
confront shortcomings and bring moral improvement. Frank speech was the 
language of friendship.1 At political, philosophical, and interpersonal levels, 
parresia was always a matter of speaking and never simply confidence.
To grasp the radical openness of the Christian congregation as a politi­
cal community, it is important to note who was not granted freedom of 
speech in ancient democracies: women, slaves, foreigners, and children. 
Because of its inclusiveness, Paul's vision of the church as a democratic com­
munity is an extreme form of democracy by the standards of the ancient 
world. He tore down the barriers to lull participation through his conviction 
that the Spirit grants free speech to all who belong to Christ. For the church 
to be the church, the voices of all must be heard.9* Even though Paul uses the
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imagery of the Greek assembly in which those trained in rhetoric had an 
advantage in promoting their purposes, he does not grant this privilege. Paul 
takes from the assembly the ideal of free speech and leaves behind the social 
status and educational distinctions that favored the speech of some to the 
exclusion of others.
Shame Brings Silence: The Spirit Brings Speech. Paul rejects the way his
culture limited the power of free speech to upper class, free males. Although 
free speech as a rhetorical activity cannot be reduced to subjectivity, it 
nonetheless did rest upon a state of mind known as pepoitbesis (confidence), 
which Paul mentions in 3:4."’ A fruitful way of interpreting 2 Corinthians 3 is 
to trace the way confidence for free speech is created. For Paul this is a theo­
logical question. Social standing and moral virtue were the two confidence- 
creating factors in Greek society. For Paul they play no role in making persons 
free and thus capable of using free speech. Instead the Spirit of the Lord cre­
ates this freedom (3:17) and does so by removing shame.
2 Cor. 3:4-18 traces how the written code, or letter (gramma), brings about 
shame and silence, the very opposite of free speech. The letter is the death of 
the church as a democratic community resting on free speech. The Spirit, on 
the other hand, is the source of its life: "The letter kills but the Spirit makes 
alive.'' The letter/Spirit distinction is not a hermeneutic distinction as many 
scholars have argued. Paul's point is not that persons who have the Spirit have 
access to the meaning of Old Testament texts by transcending the literal 
sense. Rather the letter/Spirit distinction should be understood in political 
terms." Paul is asking what makes participation in the community possible for 
all its members. What is the source of the community's freedom and free 
speech?
To amplify his claim in 2 Cor. 3:6 that the letter kills while the Spirit gives 
life, Paul employs a common rhetorical device called comparison ( sut/krisis). In 
3:7-18 he freely adopts the story of Moses' veiled face in Exodus 34. If it is the 
case that code written on stone and resulting in death occurred in glory, how 
much more glorious is the ministry of the Spirit (3:7-8). In 3:9 letter is 
renamed the ministry of condemnation and contrasted with the Spirit's min­
istry of justification. In 3:10 the old covenant is being nullified. If glory 
attaches to it in spite of its temporal limitation, then how much more will 
glory attach to work of the Spirit that remains forever. Based upon the endur­
ing work of the Spirit to create justice, Paul concludes the first comparison in 
3:12: "Therefore having such hope, we use much free speech." It is not written 
code that creates the confidence or hope upon which free speech and demo­
cratic community are based. Only the Spirit with its promise of enduring 
transformation accomplishes this.12*
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In 3:13-18 the comparison turns from the two ministries to the two min­
isters, Moses and Paul. In 3:13-15 Moses begins as a negative example but in 
3:16 emerges as a positive example.15 In 3:13 Paul tells his hearers that he is 
not like Moses insofar as Moses veiled his face so that the sons of Israel might 
not stare at the result of the old covenant. This self-veiling suggests that 
Moses hid himself from a sense of shame, since in ancient philosophy and lit­
erature there was a frequent connection between shame and concealment of 
the face." In Paul's retelling of the story, Moses does not want the people of 
Israel to see the result (ielos) of the old covenant—shame. Nevertheless the fact 
that Moses' veil is removed in 3:16 signifies an end to his shame, and he exem­
plifies its very opposite—freedom. The connection between Moses' unveiled 
face and freedom reflects a popular notion that freedom was dependent on a 
good conscience. Free speech in turn finds its legitimate basis in the freedom 
granted by a good conscience. The person having no cause to be ashamed is 
empowered to use free speech.15
Scripture Samples the Spirit's Work. The unveiled Moses and the unveiled 
Paul, both made free by the Spirit, are models of the church. Not that they are 
patterns for imitation. Rather they are samples of the reality that the Spirit is 
creating in the church. Thus Paul can begin 3:18 with the inclusive and 
emphatic "we all with uncovered face . . ." Freedom and free speech are the 
possessions of all in the congregation. The remainder of 3:18 depicts what 
happens when this freedom is allowed to run unhindered. The main event is 
ongoing transformation. The one image into which all members of the com­
munity are being shaped is Christ, who is himself the image of God (4:4). This 
transformation does not, however, happen behind the backs of the members 
of the congregation. It happens in, with, and under the exercise of freedom. It 
is accomplished as they gaze without shame into each other's faces as if into a 
mirror, simultaneously seeing themselves and the glory of the Lord. They 
become the face they see.16*
2  Cor. 3 teaches us that for Paul each member of the congregation is 
empowered by the Spirit to use free speech. The shame that in the Greco- 
Roman world was attached to being poor, female, and slave is removed by the 
Spirit. The Spirit makes it possible for each in the church to look directly at 
the other, to speak, and to be transformed into the image of Christ. 
Furthermore the use of Scripture must harmonize with this experience of lib­
eration. Transformation to an image rather than obedience to an authority is 
the key to Paul's use of Scripture. To the extent that Scripture is used as writ­
ten code and precludes the shaping of the community's will through free 
speech, it functions as the letter that kills. Yet when Scripture is read for exam­
ples of shame being removed, it offers samples of the reality of the Spirit's 
work in the church.
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Moral Action Means Extending Freedom: 
Philippians 1:27— 2:18
So far we have seen that for Paul the congregation is a community of persons 
empowered by the Spirit to speak freely. The use of Scripture must conform 
to the community's experience of all being freed for speech by the Spirit. As 
important as the inclusion of all voices is, there is more that needs to be said 
about the concrete good of the community. What is worthy action in a com­
munity whose future is determined by the inclusion of all voices in conversa­
tion? How does Scripture help to bring about this moral action? How is this 
moral action shaped by God's action in Christ?
The Moral Good of a Testing Community. In Phil. 1:27 Paul encourages 
the community of believers in Philippi to "engage politically in a manner 
worthy of the gospel of Christ." The reference to worthy action establishes 
the moral good in relation to a political process. Unfortunately modern 
translations of politeuestbe as "behave yourselves" or "conduct yourselves" do 
not help us understand that Paul portrays his audience's action in political 
terminology. The term carries the notion of initiation of policy in matters of 
the city's welfare.17 The King James translation is revealing: "Only let your 
conversation be as it becometh the gospel of Christ." The background for 
this term is democracy. It refers to citizen action within the assembly, the 
deliberating and legislative body of ancient democracies. What goes on in 
the community of those belonging to Christ is analogous to the popular 
assemblies of democratic governments.18 Paul exhorts his readers to engage 
actively through speech in the affairs of their own assembly, the local 
church. The nature of moral goodness rests on this political understanding 
of the community.
Phil. 1:9-11 deserves our attention since it also speaks of communal inter­
action and the moral good. In 1:10 the community's central activity is called 
"testing (dokimazein) the things that really matter."'1' The things that really mat­
ter carry conviction only through a procedure in which all participants are free 
to raise questions, offer objections, and make alternative recommendations 
that are themselves subject to the testing of the other members. The signifi­
cance of Paul's emphasis on testing cannot be overestimated, especially when 
compared with the other ethical paradigms of the ancient world. Paul is not 
asserting that the moral life is an imitation of universal order,- nor is it confor­
mity to a particular historical tradition. Neither is it obedience to divine com­
mand. Instead persons in community pursue consensus through testing.20* Paul 
understands the moral good as what enhances the whole community taking up 
the task of testing. Accordingly he prays for the community to abound in love, 
knowledge, and perception in order that testing might go forward. Most
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importantly testing is a privilege and responsibility of all members of the com­
munity rather than the possession of an elite group.
Paul's ethics is concerned with the way communities arrive at moral deci­
sions through the full and free participation of individuals. Placing dokim azein  
and polileuestbai in their ancient political context liberates us from the modern 
preoccupation with the moral formation of the solitary self and its accompa­
nying distortion of Pauline ethical thought. Furthermore exhortation in 
Phil. 1:27 has to do with how individuals engage politically within the com­
munity that is constituted by the narrative of Christ. Paul directs his hearers 
to evaluate their participation from a perspective that is established by the nar­
rative of Christ Jesus in 2:5-11.
Christ Creates Our Freedom. Paul introduces the Christ hymn in Philippians 
2 by exhorting the community to adopt the same mind as exists in Christ Jesus. 
The narrative begins in 2:6 with a political community composed of God and 
Christ Jesus. We are justified in speaking of the relationship between God and 
Christ Jesus as a political community if we interpret the concept of equality in 
the phrase "to be equal with God" in an adverbial sense rather than adjectival. 
Equality refers to the way God and Christ Jesus exist with one another rather 
than the identity of some quality, often described by commentators as "divin­
ity." Paul is speaking of equality as equal participation in the governance of the 
community, or as Aristotle called it, "reciprocal equality."21
We need to re-conceptualize the Christ hymn from the perspective of 
equality employed in the discourse of democracy. Phil. 2:6b-8 narrates Christ 
Jesus' decision not to keep his equality with God to himself but as something 
that must be extended to others. Christ Jesus opens the limits on equality with 
God. Notice what is not said. The pattern of the Father sending the Son, 
which plays an important a role in Paul's other letters (for example, Rom. 8:3), 
is not the hymn's underlying narrative. Rather the emphasis falls on Christs 
refusal to limit the political community to himself and God. The story is not 
of Jesus' conformity to God's will but of his own initiative to extend equality 
with God to others.
To extend equality with God, Christ Jesus takes on the form of a slave. 
How is his slavery able to communicate equality in participation with God? 
This is impossible to grasp if it is assumed, as in the case of many interpreters, 
that Christ's slavery is to God as master.22 There is, however, another inter­
pretation of 2:7-8 that makes better sense of the narrative. Christ's obedience 
is given to humans not to God. Similarly his voluntary slavery is directed to 
humanity.21 To understand the significance of Christ's voluntary slavery, we 
need to recall the origin of freedom according to ancient political philosophy.
Freedom has a material foundation. Civic freedom depended on freedom 
from daily tasks. Aristotle emphasizes the dependence of the master's freedom
upon the slave's labor: "Therefore all people rich enough to be able to avoid 
personal trouble have a steward who takes this office, while they themselves 
engage in politics (politeuovrai) or philosophy."21 In the narrative Christ Jesus 
becomes humanity's obedient slave and thus creates freedom for his masters at 
the expense of his own body. He empties himself to create freedom for others.
The Moral Life as a Shared Paradox of Power. The first half of the Christ 
hymn helps us understand what it means for the church to "engage politically 
in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ" (Phil. 1:27). Christ extends to 
others democratic participation in the divine community. The means to this 
end is his voluntary enslavement to those he wishes to free.” Thus to engage 
in the affairs of the community worthily of the gospel of Christ, each mem­
ber, conscious of freedom, must take up the same goal: to extend participa­
tion to the other. Each will employ the same means to this end: voluntary 
slavery to the other.
What significance might this notion of mutual slavery have had for Paul's 
hearers? The answer is in the paradoxical character of the communal relations 
implied by mutual obedience. Each person in the community is simultane­
ously master and slave, ruler and ruled. This paradox has an antecedent in the 
understanding of sharing power in ancient democracies. Aristotle pointed out 
that the distinguishing mark of political rule (as opposed to the rule of mas­
ter over slave or male over household) was an exchange of ruling and being 
ruled. Citizens must learn both to exercise authority over others and to obey 
the authority of those whom they once ruled or would ride.26 In democratic 
arrangements of power a citizen could expect over time to be both ruler and 
ruled. Paul introduces a new factor by removing the temporal succession, but 
there is enough similarity between his understanding of the Christian com­
munity and power sharing in Greek democracies to make a meaningful com­
parison. By removing temporal succession, Paul makes more complex the 
relationships between the members of the community. While each is a mas­
ter—a full participant in the divine community—each is also a slave to the 
others. Yet since this slavery is mutual within the congregation, the slave is 
again made a master.27
We are now able to state the relation between ethics and politics in Paul 
based upon the exhortation to "engage politically in a manner worthy of the 
gospel of Christ." If we focus on the verb, each member of the community is 
exhorted to play an active role in the formation of the group's plans, policies, 
and objectives. What is remarkable about this exhortation is the predomi­
nance of a process of participation to work out a mutually acceptable form of 
life over assimilation to an already determined form of life or obedience to 
divine command. There is an openness that is to be limited by the participants 
themselves through speech and persuasion.
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Nevertheless modifying (but not retracting!) the high degree of individ­
ual participation and initiative is the adverbial phrase "worthily of the gospel 
of Christ.'' In, with, and under the moral claims and testing initiated by com­
munity members, another activity goes on in which each individual extends 
freedom for equal participation in the community of God and Christ Jesus to 
the other. It must be acknowledged that this activity, initiated by and modeled 
on the voluntary slavery of Christ to humanity and his self-lowering in obscu­
rity, is in tension with the verb politeuesthai. How can I assert my freedom by 
proposing and defending controversial moral claims and simultaneously 
empty myself for the other in slavelike obedience? One might reject this ten­
sion as a Pauline blunder or mystification through paradox, but taking it seri­
ously could be the beginning of fruitful reflection on the character of the 
moral good in Christian congregations. What concretely does it mean to 
extend freedom to the other? What kind of community is this that presumes 
both individual initiative and mutual obedience?
The Christ Hymn and Paul's Use of Scripture. Before leaving Philippians 
we note the absence in 1:27—2:18 of Scripture as a norm for moral action.28 
Paul does not show the slightest interest in applying an already established 
moral code to the life of the Philippian congregation. This we should expect 
in light of his critique of written code in 2 Cor. 3. It is also consistent with his 
vision of all the members of the community engaging in political action 
through speech and the testing of things that matter. We must not, however, 
make the mistake of equating Scripture with written code and think that Paul 
throws the former out with the latter. As we saw in the story of Moses' veil, 
Scripture is full of both positive and negative examples that embody the atti­
tudes and behavior appropriate to a community whose members are simulta­
neously free and slave to one another.
Even though there is no explicit use of Scripture for exhortation purposes 
in Phil. 1:27—2:18, the theory lying behind the way Paul employs Scripture 
in other letters is present. In other words, the way he uses the narrative of 
Christ in 2:5-11 is the way he uses Scripture in general. Certain terms in 
1:27—2:18 arc drawn from the theory of example in Greco-Roman moral 
exhortation.2I> Rather than code, Scripture provides examples of character. Paul 
offers the examples to the church for imitation and thus for the formation of 
the character that is the source of appropriate action in the community estab­
lished by Christ's extension of freedom through his own slavery. In Philippians 
Paul surrounds the Christ hymn with two of the main technical terms for 
moral exhortation employed by the philosophers of his day: paraklesis and 
p a ra m y tb io n ,i0 Also borrowing from the ancient conventions of moral exhorta­
tion, he offers himself to the congregation as an example in 1:30.
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The significance of Paul relying on example rather than code cannot be 
overestimated. Paul does not demand obedience to an authoritative set of 
rules, to his own apostolic authority, or even to Christ as the teacher who 
knows Gods will. Instead he exhorts his hearers to be transformed into the 
pattern of Christ's liberating action narrated in the hymn.” This transforma­
tion begins by the Spirit's free gift of the mind of Christ to the community.'3* 
As we will see in Rom. 15:1-6, Paul regards Scripture as a repository of this 
transformed mind, a collection of stories displaying Christ's mind. Christ's 
mind, of course, is not only or even primarily example.” It is not simply a goal 
to be striven toward. Christ's mind already exists in his hearers by virtue of 
their participation in the Spirit (2:1), or as we read in 2:5: "Have this mind 
among you which is yours in Christ Jesus."
Bearing Difference to the World: Romans 12—1 5
Connecting morality so closely with Christian congregations may lead some 
to suspect that such an ethic is naive in two ways. First, does the church have 
the capacity to test all things when there is radical difference among the mem­
bers? W hat happens when Paul's exhortation to test all things comes to mem­
bers who regard some moral matters so firmly established as to be exempt 
from testing? W hat if speaking about them is unnecessary, if not itself 
immoral? Second is the suspicion of a kind of churchly isolationism. Does 
Paul's political church have the resources to create public significance out of 
an ethic that concerns itself primarily with the internal interactions of the 
members of the body of Christ?
Difference Does Not Put an End to Testing. In Romans 12-15 Paul 
responds to these challenges. He does so first by the test case of an audience 
composed of two groups: the weak in faith (14:1) and the powerful (15:1). 
Paul identifies himself with the latter group, for whom the distinction of clean 
and unclean is meaningless. They are convinced that nothing in itself is 
unclean (14:14). The weak in faith, however, hold that certain foods are pol­
luting (14:2) and certain times are sacred (14:5). The clash of worldviews 
could hardly be more striking. The weak judge the strong, and the strong 
count the weak as nobodies, attitudes that reveal the additional dynamic of 
social class. It should be underscored that the Pauline exhortation to test all 
things is inherently biased toward the strong. They possess a knowledge of 
things in which no division of space and time into sacred and profane stands 
in the way of questioning and searching out God's will. The weak, on the 
other hand, cannot place all matters on the table without first giving up the 
way they believe the world to be in relation to God. The openness toward
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change that is assumed in the Pauline vision of the church as the location of 
the Spirit's liberating presence (2 Cor. 3:17-18) is at odds with the perception 
of the world in categories of clean and unclean.
Yet Paul does not ask the strong to back away Irom the centrality of test­
ing in the community's life. In fact in 12:1-2 Paul lets it be known that the 
church's chief activity is to "test (dokim azein) what is the will of God, the good 
and pleasing and perfec t.N o tice , however, that the capacity for testing is 
not given with the knowledge or social structures of "this age." Testing the will 
of God depends upon a prior transformation that in turn depends upon a 
renewing of the mind. Here we see how Paul addresses the question of what 
becomes of testing in a community in which some are not committed to the 
testability of all things while others already engage in critical reflection. One 
of the tasks Paul takes up in Romans 12-15 is to delineate the character of 
mind that responds in love to those who must restrict the scope of matters in 
which God's will is to be tested. Paul thus maintains the pattern he established 
in Phil. 1:27. Free participation in the community's life is both asserted and 
modified by practical reasoning not given in the natural course of things but 
only in the narrative of Christ and through the Spirit.
The other challenge to Paul's political conception of the church is the 
apparent isolation of the congregation's ethics from the broader society. If 
what counts in Christian morality is the process through which decisions are 
reached and the insistence that all voices are to be heard, then it becomes a 
real problem to conceive how the church as the body of Christ acts in the 
world at all. Romans 13 provides a link between the inner working of congre­
gational life and society.
Public Sphere and the Metaphor of Debt. Paul's most original contribution 
to Christian ethics is the way he weaves together testing in a heterogeneous 
community with the community's relationship with the world. He is forced to 
deal with the complexity of the church's relation to society because he does 
not have the simple solution provided by a church speaking with one voice to 
the world about moral matters, as if all its members (or at least the ones who 
count) had privileged access to truth. This notion of a single voice on moral 
matters would violate his notion that the church is a place of ongoing moral 
conversation in which no voice may be shamed into silence. It also minimizes 
his belief that the law is written on the hearts of all people (Rom. 2:12-16). 
Most of all, to conceptualize the church as a monolithic source of moral facts 
prevents it from making its unique contribution to civil society. Paul argues in 
Romans 13-15 that the church models for the world a way of carrying forth 
in unity in the presence of conflicting moral claims.
Romans 13 has been interpreted to speak of two separate matters.1' 
Supposedly in verses 1-7 Paul deals with the believer's responsibility to obey
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civil government and in verses 8-14 with the individual's moral life in general- 
In this interpretation Paul advocates a quietist ethic with respect to Christian 
involvement in society. One obeys the civil authorities to avoid drawing atten­
tion to the small band of believers. What is missing in this interpretation is 
careful attention to God's creation and preservation of the public sphere. The 
issue in Rom. 13:1-7 is not whether one should obey the government but how 
one conceives of the public sphere in the first place. 13:8-14 goes on to speak 
of the way the congregation contributes to and transforms the public sphere.
God creates and preserves public life. We should note that Paul does not 
describe his readers' actual experience of political rule in first-century Rome. 
Rather he builds upon the ideology of kingship originating in the philosophic 
response to the rule exercised by Alexander the Great and his successors. After 
Alexander's conquest, public spheres were created and preserved less fre­
quently through democratic means and more often by monarchical rule. 
Before Paul can conceptualize how the church's inner life contributes to and 
transforms society (13:8-15:13), he has to provide his readers with a theory of 
the public sphere that is intelligible and poses no insurmountable obstacles to 
the church's influence. The Hellenistic ideology of kingship with its subordi­
nation of power to justice provides such a theoretical beginning.
When Paul says in Rom. 13:4 that the ruler is "God's servant for you for 
the good," he has captured the basic insight of Hellenistic theorists of monar­
chical rule who sought to place limits on the kings power. Ruling authority 
exists for the sake of the public good not for the ambitions of those who 
occupy the office. As God orders and creates harmony in the heavens, so the 
good king brings about peace and friendship among persons on earth by exe­
cuting justice, honoring those who contribute to the common good, and con­
ducting his affairs in an exemplary manner. The good kings rule mirrors divine 
rule.36 The coercive dimension of rule, to which Paul alludes with such terms 
as judgment, fear, and sword, exists to suppress evil. Paul also emphasizes in 
13:3 that the role of the ruler is to honor those who make a positive contri­
bution to the community's life. Finally in 13:6 Paul mentions that the rule is 
undertaken at great expense and personal trouble to the ruler.
Paul also makes a connection between the account of the public sphere 
offered in 13:1-7 to the inner life of the church in 13:8. The glue that binds 
the ruled to the ruler is the obligation to repay debt. In 13:5 subordination to 
civil authority is necessary not merely out of fear of punishment but more 
importantly from a sense of fairness. The reason that taxes are paid and respect 
given (13:6-7) is that the rulers have put forth great personal effort on behalf 
of the ruled. Justice therefore demands that something is owed them. From 
this reasoning comes the Pauline exhortation: "Repay the debts to all (apodote 
pctsitt tas opbeiltis)."
Paul's exhortation in Rom. 13:8 must be interpreted in the context of 
obligation within the public sphere discussed in 13:5-7. Although debts gen­
erated by the civil authority's effort to bring about justice must be repaid, one 
obligation toward the ruling authority can never be fully discharged. Members 
of the community of believers are in a perpetual state of obligation to the 
broader human community to love one another: "Owe no one anything, 
except to love one another." Paul does not exhort his hearers to love persons 
outside of the community of believers, although the notion of doing good to 
outsiders is certainly not an idea foreign to his thought (Gal. 6:10). The point 
is that the congregation is a debtor to civil authority. The way it attempts to 
repay—but never thinking it has fully discharged its obligation—is through 
mutual loving relations within the congregation itself (which I will examine 
shortly). Note the unique way Paul is conceptualizing the relation between 
church and civil society. The metaphor of debt presents a complex interplay 
between the church's inner life and its relationship to the public sphere.’7 It is 
the medium through which the church's ethic, built up around its politics, can 
have an effect on the greater society.
Christ, Scripture, and the Meaning of Love. In Rom. 15:1 we read, "We 
who are powerful ought to carry the weaknesses of those who are not power­
ful and not please ourselves." Standing behind the word "ought" is the Greek 
word opheilo. With a word play, Paul connects the obligation described in 15:1 
to his earlier discussion of the public sphere in 13:7-8 where debt (opheile) is 
repaid and his hearers are to owe (opbeilete) nothing to anyone except to love 
one another. The terms "good" and "neighbor" in 15:2 also remind the reader 
of the transition between the public and the church in 13:7-10. Love within 
the community, the perpetual debt to the wider society, is made concrete in 
the phrase "to carry (bastaze iii)" weaknesses." But what does this mean?
In a negative sense it means that the powerful are not to cause the weak 
to violate their own conscience. Paul alludes to this principle in 14:5: "Let each 
be fully convinced in their own mind." The worst thing that can happen is for 
the powerful to cause the weak to be grieved (14:15) or to stumble (14:20). 
This amounts to the destruction of the ones for whom Christ died (14:15), 
who are the creation of God (14:19). To love is not to bring the other into self­
judgment and self-condemnation in the matter that is being tested (14:22-23). 
Paul offers a theory about the use of Scripture in 13:8-10 that correlates with 
his idea about what love does not do. Love fulfills the law because it "does not 
work evil toward the neighbor" (13:10). Love summarizes the prohibitions of 
the law (13:9). But the logic of summary and fulfillment leads the congrega­
tion away from actually reading Scripture since the prohibitions are already 
contained in the command to love.
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Paul develops the positive sense of "carry" in Rom. 15:3-6. In doing so he 
comes up with a fuller theory of the use of Scripture.1" As in 2 Cor. 3 and Phil. 
1:27-—2:18, the theory prefers example/transformation to command/obedi- 
ence. Christ's example of not pleasing himself is cited in 15:3, and this is 
expanded by discovering in Scripture (Ps. 69:9) the mind of Christ. With this 
turn to Scripture as the repository of Christ's mind, "bearing" another person 
comes into clearer focus: "The reproaches of those reproaching you fell upon 
me." This is not sympathy or toleration but the actual feeling, thinking, and 
living in the world of the other as experienced in shame, which was the result 
of a rebuke as severe as a reproach (oneidismos). Reminiscent of mutual slavery 
as the mark of the entire community in Philippians 2, the prayer in Rom. 15:5 
makes clear that the gift of Christ's mind is finally for all the members. Thus 
the congregation's unity does not rest in its agreement about moral topics, 
although each member has the right to initiate testing with the hope of con­
sensus. Rather the church's unity resides in the gift of God, in each member 
sharing the mind of Christ, in each bearing in himself or herself the reproach 
that falls upon the other. This unity brings glory to God (15:6). When per­
ceived by the world, the church's obligation to society is perpetually dis­
charged (15:7-13).
Paul and Lutheran Ethics
I have a made a case for understanding Pauline ethics in terms of two distinct 
but related activities. Both are carried out in the church by means of the Spirit.
The first activity is political. It is the church's testing of values received 
from tradition or culture. Paul takes from the history of Greek democracy the 
vision of a community whose members are free to initiate discussion about any 
matter yet also responsible to give reasons for any claim made. Paul radicalizes 
this vision in two ways. First he is convinced that the Spirit gives' the right of 
testing to all for whom Christ died regardless of the status markers that they 
bear in the world. Second, testing goes on in a community that is composed 
of God, Christ, and the church. Testing then is not just a good idea or an 
effective means to build community (it may sometimes seem otherwise!),- it is 
a theological activity. God's life can no longer be understood apart from the 
life of the community that lives in the freedom for testing extended to it by 
Christ's death.
The second activity is ethical. The moral good is the mutual extension of 
freedom within the community. Paul uses the images of slavery and burden 
bearing to depict the freedom creating action of Christ for us. Living out of 
this narrative, the church is a place where persons are mutually and voluntar­
ily enslaved to one another, dedicated to the other's freedom. It is also the
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place where real differences are present and the other's shame carried. The 
world sees this ethos and glorifies God.
Paul's chief contribution to Lutheran ethics is his vision of the church as a 
community of moral deliberation in which the political and the ethical exist 
simultaneously and energize each other. It is crucial not to break them apart. 
Any approach to Lutheran ethics that emphasizes simply the process of com­
ing to moral decisions and ignores the ethos of the community— its living out 
of the story of Christ— will not reflect the Pauline vision since it will have lost 
sight of the moral task of extending freedom to the other and bearing the 
other's difference. Conversely any proposal that thinks only in terms of the 
community's identity and the ethos it has received from the tradition will 
abandon the critical principle within Paul's ethics and fail to do justice to the 
freedom granted by the Spirit through the death of Christ for us. Lutherans 
must discover from Paul what they already know-—to live simultaneously free 
and bound.
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52. Ronald F. T h iem ann , R elig ion  in  P u b lic  Life (W ashin gton, D  C.: G eorgetow n  U niversity  
Press, 1996).
Chapter 7: Pauline Ethics
1. If o n e  undertakes this task exp ectin g  to find specific  teach ings norm ative for individuals, 
th en  o n e  m ust be prepared for surprises. C onservatives and liberals alike will be d ism ayed to  find  
Paul advocatin g  eth ica l p osition s that are unsuited to their ow n causes. A  g o o d  exam ple o f  this 
is Paul's v iew  o f  th e  hum an body, w hich  inform s the statem ents h e  m akes about sexual practice. 
D ale  M artin in T h e  C o rin th ia n  B o d y  (N e w  H aven: Yale U niversity  Press, 1995) dem onstrates that 
o n ly  w ith  th e  blinders o f  anachronism  can Paul's asceticism  b e  ignored and the apostle  be  
regarded as th e  cham p ion  o f heterosexuality. Yet w h o  in current sexuality debates advocates  
Paul's position: ascetic  control o f  th e b o d y  and marriage as preventative measure against desire?
2. * For the challenges to this approach in Lutheran ethics and an outline for moving forward, 
see Robert Benne's concluding remarks in his chapter.
3 . * This approach to Lutheran ethics is illustrated by Larry Rasmussen and Cynthia Moe- 
Lobeda’s chapter.
4. Today the term "political" is often used derisively as a synonym for deceitful and secretive 
power plays. I emphasize just the opposite. To be political means to conduct oneself publicly and 
to put power in the context of persuasion with a strict avoidance of force. "Democracy" has suf­
fered almost as much as "political" in the common notion that it simply means voting on already 
established options. I use the term "democratic" in line with the classical sense of power in the 
hands of the people. This means that "democratic" includes raising issues and public argument 
aiming toward consensus.
5. Fora previous attempt to interpret Paul's thought in political categories, see D . Fredrickson, 
"Free Speech in Pauline Political Theology," W o rd  & W o rld  12 (1992): 3 4 5 -5 1 .
6 . * Free speech  in the m odern period tends to loose  its political m ooring and drift in to  the  
right o f individual "self-expression." Reinhard Flutter in this b o o k  sees som eth in g  like this turn 
as th e core fallacy o f Protestant eth ics. H is masterful d etection  o f  self-leg islation  under th e cover  
of traditional Lutheran them es is an appropriate w arning against individualism  in m y attem pt to  
think about Lutheran eth ics in terms o f Pauline free sp eech . Yet his co n sla tc tiv e  proposal for a 
decentered  self does not lit w ith Paul, w h o  was concerned  that persons not considered  selves in 
the ancient w orld be em pow ered to speak, in fact to  becom e selves. Today this is as pressing an 
issue as deth ron ing the autonom ous self. S in ce  for Paul th e self's b ecom in g  alw ays takes p lace in 
th e con tex t o f oth er vo ices, h e  is not defen d in g  autonom y by prom oting free speech . 
Furthermore as w e w ill see  below , h e  em ph asizes th e right o f  all believers to  initiate moral d is­
cussion  in all matters. D ecen ter in g  th e se lf g o es  to o  far if it d iscourages such initiation.
7. S ee  R. Bultm ann, T h e  Secon d  Letter to  the C o rin th ian s (M inneapolis: Augsburg, 1985), 85. Luther 
favored free sp eech , but b eg in n in g  in th e last part o f th e  n in eteenth  century, interest in subjec­
tivity took  over, and th e  ancient defin ition  as "boldness in words" was dropped. S ec D . 
Fredrickson, “P a rresia  in the Pauline Epistles," in F riendsh ip, F la tte ry , a n d  F ran kn ess o f  Speech . S tu d ies  o n  
Friendsh ip  in the N e w  T estam ent W o r ld , ed . J. Fitzgerald (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 1 6 3 -6 5 .
8. Plutarch, H our to Tell a  F la tterer from  a  Friend 51 C ; Philo, W h o  Is the H eir?  21. U n less otherwise- 
indicated, references to ancient literature are to  th e  Loeb Classical Library.
9 . * Richard Perry's chapter traces th e  abolition ist argum ent in Lutheran synods prior to  the  
C ivil War. H e  tells o f th e pow er o f African Am erican Lutherans to  ch an ge m inds through argu­
ment,- h e  also narrates th e exclusion  o f their vo ices  and resistance even  to  their claim s b e in g  made 
public. Both stories are necessary m em ories for Lutherans. H is  essay raises th e critical question  
o f h ow  Paul's vision  o f th e church can b e  realized w h en  groups o f  persons are excluded  from  
sp eech  or intim idated in to  silence. Can others speak for th em  until th ey  are perm itted to  speak  
openly? C an their suffering itse lf be presented  to  th e church as an argument? In Pauline terms, 
can their groaning b ecom e th e church's prayer in th e presence o f  C o d  (Rom . 8 :18-27)?
10. For pepoithesis as the psychological basis for free speech, see Josephus, J ew ish  A n tiq u itie s  
19.317-18,- 1 Clement 35.2,■ Phil. 1:I4; Eph. 3:12.
11. Against E. Kasemann, P erspectives on P a u l (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971): 1 3 8 -6 6 . For a cri­
tique of Kasemann and an alternative proposal stressing moral formation as the key to the let- 
ter/Spirit distinction, see S. Westerholm, "Letter and Spirit: The Foundation of Pauline Ethics,"
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N e w  Testam ent S tu dies 30 (1984): 2 2 9 -4 8 . S om eth in g  like Paul's letter/Spirit d istin ction  ex isted  in 
the p h ilosop h ic  critique o f th e written code's coerc ion  and inability to  bring about justice in the  
city. For remarkable parallels to 2 Cor. 3 on this point, see  D io  C hrysostom , O r a tio n  7 6 .1 -4 .
12. * James M . C hilds in this book  docum ents the rediscovery o f Cod's future (w hat Paul poin ts  
to  .by "Spirit") as a critical com p on en t in Christian eth ics, esp ecia lly  as it overcom es the  
dich otom y o f personal faith and social action  often  associated  w ith  th e Lutheran doctrine o f tw o  
kingdom s. Childs's em phasis on God's prom ise en erg izin g  persons for w itn ess captures the  
Pauline m ove to ground con fid en ce  in th e work o f th e Spirit and to place it in the con tex t o f  the 
church as assem bly rather than in th e individual's con sciou sn ess o f C od .
13. "Example” here is not for im itation but for proof. For this use o f exam ple in rhetoric, see  
13. Fiore, T h e F un ction  o f  P erso n a l E xam ple  in the S o c ra lic  a n d  P a s to ra l E pistles (Rom e: Biblical Institute, 
1986), 2 6 -3 3 .
14. See Fredrickson, "Parresia in the Pauline Epistles," 1 7 7 -7 8 . S ee Plato, P b a e d ru s 24313,• 
Epictetus, D isco u rse  3 .2 2 .1 5 -1 6 . By th e face the person can be know n. A ccording to  ancient p h ys­
iognom ists, there was no better part o f the hum an b o d y  for d etectin g  character traits and tem ­
perament.
15. Epictetus, D isco u rse  3 .2 2 .1 8 -1 9 , 9 3 -9 5 ;  D io  C hrysostom , O r a tio n  3 2 .1 1.
16. * T h e mirror played an im portant role in th e theory o f exam ple in G reco-R om an moral 
exhortation . T h e  person progressing in virtue was to  look  at a w orthy person from th e past as if 
look in g  in a mirror. T h e  im age was sim ultaneously the goal to  be striven toward and th e face of 
th e on e look ing. Such gazing  w orked transform ation. Paul's reference to th e mirror reinforces his 
rejection o f  Scripture as w ritten cod e  and underscores his reliance both  upon face to face rela­
tions in the church and upon a theory o f exam ple in his appropriation o f Scripture as w itness of 
th e Spirit's work, For Luther's similar em phasis on transform ation w ith in  a com m unal setting  as 
progress into th e im age o f Christ, see  M artha Stortz's chapter.
17. A side from som e C ynics and C lem ent o f A lexandria, ancient authors used  th is term for lin ­
guistic interaction betw een  persons rather than th e conform ity  o f th e individual to  an ethical 
ideal. For the term in dem ocratic A thens, see  N . Loraux, "Reflections o f  th e  G reek C ity  on  U n ity  
and Division," in C i ty  S la tes  in C la ss ica l A n t iq u i ty  a n d  M e d ie v a l I ta l y , eds. A. M o lh o , K. Raaflaub, and  
J. Emlen (Ann Arbor: U niversity  o f  M ich igan , 1991), 35. For later d evelop m en ts, see  E. Gruen, 
"The Polis in th e H ellen istic  World," in N om o de ik les  C reek  Studies in H o n o r  o f  M a r tin  O s h v a ld , eds. R. 
Rosen and J . Farrell (A nn Arbor: U niversity  o f  M ich igan , 1993): 3 3 9 -5 4 . T h e  sen se  o f  initiation  
and even  innovation  is underscored by  th e  fact that by th e fourth century B.C.E. th e term was 
defin ed  in op p osition  to  idioles: a c itizen  present at th e  assem bly w h o  participated b y  vo tin g  only, 
n ot by  sp eech es  and oth er  forms o f  influence. See J. O ber, M a s s  a n d  E lite in D em o cra tic  A th en s:  
R h eto ric , Id e o lo g y , a n d  the P o w e r  o f  the P eop le  (Princeton: P rinceton U niversity, 1989), 1 0 6 -9 .
18. W ayne M eeks appropriately draws atten tion  to  th e bo ld ness o f  early C hristians nam ing  
th em selves ekklesia in ligh t o f this term's association  w ith  dem ocracy. S ee  T h e  F irst U rb a n  Christians-. 
T h e  S o c ia l  W o r ld  o f  the A p o s tle  P a u l (N ew  H aven: Yale U niversity  Press, 1983), 108. H e  d oes  not, 
how ever, develop  th is insight in to  a princip le o f  Pauls e cc lc s io lo g y  as I am proposing here. At 
tim es Luther's e cc le s io lo g y  is expressed w ith  th e h elp  o f  political imagery,- see  "On th e  Papacy 
in Rome" (1 5 2 0 ), I .W  39, 65,• "On th e C ou n cils  and th e Church" (1 5 3 9 ), L W  41 , 1 4 3 -4 5 . T h is is 
esp ecia lly  th e case w h en  th e  Lord's Supper as th e  foundation  o f  C hristian com m u nity  is stressed,- 
see  'T h e  B lessed Sacram ent o f  th e  H o ly  and True Body o f  C hrist, and th e  Brotherhoods" (1 519), 
L W  3 5 ,5 1: "H ence it is that C hrist and all saints are o n e  spiritual body, just as th e inhabitants o f  
a c ity  are o n e  com m u nity  and body, each  c itizen  b e in g  a m em ber o f th e  o th er  and o f  th e  entire  
city. All th e  saints, therefore, are m em bers o f C hrist and o f th e church, w h ich  is a spiritual and  
eternal c ity  o f  G od . . . .  To receive this sacram ent in bread and w ine, th en , is no th in g  else  than  
to  receive a sure sign o f  this fe llow sh ip  and incorporation w ith  C hrist and all th e saints. It is as 
if a c itizen  w ere given  a sign , a docum en t, or som e oth er  token to  assure him  that h e  is a c itizen  
o f th e city, a m em ber o f that particular com m unity." For th e church as a freedom  b estow in g  c o m ­
m unity in analogy to  th e  city , see  L W  35, 57 , 60 .
19. T h e  occurrence o f  d o k im a zein  in 1 T hess. 5:21 deserves a brief com m en t. A lth ough  there is 
som e support for th inking o f "testing all things" as a precaution against an overzealous attitude  
tow ard th e w ork o f th e  Spirit, it m akes b etter  sen se here to  interpret testing  itse lf as spiritual on  
th e  sam e order as not desp ising  proph ecy  and not qu en ch in g  th e  Spirit. As such it is th e  neces-
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sary precondition to the moral life defined by Paul in terms found also in Greco-Roman moral 
philosophy: "Hold fast to the good and abstain from every form of evil."
20. * My debt to the moral theory of Jurgen Habermas for interpreting d ok im a zein  needs to be 
recognized. For testing in Habermas, see W. Rehg, Insigh t a n d  S o lid a r ity :  A  S tu d y  in the D isco u rse  
E th ics o f  Jurgen H ab erm as (llerkelcy: University of California Press, 1994), 5 6 -8 3 . It is an intriguing 
question whether communicative ethics has Luther as one of its ancestors. The connection is the 
reformer's insistence that the local congregation has the right and responsibility to test all things. 
Luther regarded the congregations office of judging doctrine as the foundation of the other 
offices of ministry that the baptized share,- see "Concerning the Ministry" ( 1523), L W  40, 3 1 -3 4 , 
and "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed" ( 1523), L W  45, 117. The reform 
of the church depends upon this freedom to test, see “Against the Roman Papacy, An Institution 
of the Devil" (1 5 4 5 ), L W  41, 269. For testing in congregations, see Cert Haendler, Luther on 
M in is te r ia l O ff ic e  a n d  C o n g re g a tio n a l F un ction  (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 5 5 -6 6 . I thank my col­
league Gary Simpson for pointing out the similarity between this aspect of Luthers ecclesiology 
and communicative ethics. Childs's call in this book for "dialogue among the people of God and 
with the world" implements the Pauline notion of testing.
21. Aristotle, P o litic s  2.1 .5 .
22. See, for example, S. Fowl, T h e  S to r y  o f  C h ris t in the E th ics o f  P a u l: A n  A n a ly s is  o f  the F unction  o f  
the H y m n ic  M a te r ia l in the P a u lin e  C o rp u s (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), 5 8 -5 9 . The danger of this 
reading is that it can and indeed has been taken to grant theological legitimacy to domination 
among humans: Persons of little social power must be submissive to those of higher status just as 
Christ was obedient to the Father. This danger is usually ignored by white, male commentators 
who do not seem to be aware of the way their praise of Christ's obedience to the higher power 
is heard by groups traditionally excluded from power. Sheila Briggs in "Can an Enslaved God 
Liberate?" Sem eia  4 7  ( 1989): 1 4 2 -5 1, unmasks this idealization of slavery and hierarchical roles in 
the prevailing interpretation of the Christ hymn. I hope to preserve Paul from her valid critique 
of his interpreters by stressing that Christ's slavery is voluntary, given to humans, and is the 
model for mutual slavery within the church. The latter notion, seldom stressed, most powerfully 
removes the Christ hymn from the arsenal of oppression.
23. Luther's interpretation of the Christ hymn generally favors the notion that Christ became 
our slave and not that he gave obedience to the Father. His opinion on this is not uniform, how­
ever, see "Sermon on the Man Born Blind, John 9: 1- 38" (1 518), L W  51, 38. Moreover, he does 
not develop this idea in conversation with the political theory with which Paul seems to have 
been familiar. Rather the com m u nica lio  id iom atum  is at stake. Nevertheless there is compatibility 
between Luther and Paul on this point. Through his voluntary slavery to us, Christ wanted to be 
seen "living as if all the evils which were ours were actually his own." "Two Kinds of 
Righteousness" (1519), L W  31, 3 0 1 -2 . Luther comes closest to Paul's notion of (Christ's slavery 
creating our freedom when he emphasizes the "from Christ to us" direction in the exchange of 
properties, see Lectures on G a la tia n s  (1535) L W  26, 288, "The Freedom of a Christian" (1520), L W  
31, 349, 3 5 1 -5 5 , 366. Luther holds to the idea of Christ's slavery to us outside of commenting 
on the Christ hymn, see First Lectures on the P sa lm s (1 5 1 3 -1 5 ), L W  10, 324. The resurrected and 
ascended Jesus still serves us, see Sermons on the G ospel o f  S t, John  ( 1537), L W  24, 190.
24. A ristotle, P o litic s  1.2.23. Cf. ibid., 2 .6 .2 , 2 .8 ,5 -6 , 4 .5 .2 -6 , 6 .2 .1 ,7 .8 .2 -3 ,  Plutarch, L ycu rgu s  
24 .2 , idem , C o m p ariso n  o f  A r is tid e  a n d  C a to  3 -4 , Philo, S p e cia l L a w s  2.123 .
25. Readers may have difficulty accepting the notion that Christ's slavery grants us freedom 
in the divine community. Indeed the equality with God that Christ communicates to us is ludi­
crous if one adheres to the substance theory of equality. If, however, equality is viewed in terms 
of access to conversation as I have argued above, then there is no necessity for us to become 
omniscient, omnipresent, and so on. We remain creatures even as we are taken into God's life and 
join with God in the creation of the future through speech, Luther does not hesitate to follow 
Paul in this regard. The Christian through faith has obtained the form of God, see "The Freedom 
of the Christian" (1520), L W  31, 366, See further Sermons on the F irst Epistle o f  S t. P eter (1522), L W  
30, 67 , Serm ons on the Secon d  E pistle  o f  S t. P eter ( 1523), L W  30, 155. Most striking is "The Magnificat" 
(1521), L W  21, 351: "Through Christ she [Christendom] is joined to God as a bride to her bride­
groom, so that the bride has a right to, and power over, her Bridegroom's body and all His pos­
sessions, all of this happens through faith, By faith man does what God wills, God in turn does 
what man wills,"
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26. Aristotle, P o litic s  1.5.1-2,- 2 .1 .5; 3 .2 .7; 3 .2 .11 . C f. Plutarch, A i/es ila u s  1.1—3,-2.1; idem, To a it 
U n ed u ca ted  R u le r  78015, idem, O ld  Men in P u b lic  A ffa irs 7 8 3 D .
27. The Christian as simultaneously free and slave is at the heart of Luther's ethical thought, 
and for this paradox he looks frequently to the Christ hymn, often in conjunction with 1 Cor. 
9:19. The critical question is whether Luther understood slavery in the same way Paul did, as the 
basis of the other's freedom. For Luther the slavery motif sometimes pertains to the conscious­
ness in which a good work is done, pointing to the removal of arrogance when the powerful help 
the weak and in its place the joy of giving and the absence of obligation generated by the gift; 
see 'Two Kinds of Righteousness" (1519), L W  31, 3 0 2 -3 ;  T h e  Freedom of a Christian" (1520), 
L \V  31, 3 5 6 -5 7 . In these instances Luther does not reflect Pauls notion of the mutual slavery of 
all in the congregation. Yet in other passages when Luther discusses the relationship between 
sacraments and the life of the church, he sounds more Pauline by moving beyond attitude, 
employing the notion of the communication of properties and assuming that the context is the 
congregation in which all are free and slave,- see T h e  blessed Sacrament of the Holy and True 
Body of Christ, and the Brotherhoods" (1 5 1 9 ), L W  35, 5 8 -5 9 , 67 , T h e  Adoration of the 
Sacrament" (1 523), L W  36, 2 8 6 -8 7 .
28. In 2:7 "slave" is not a reference to Isa. 53, W h ile  Phil. 2:10-1 I is clearly an allusion to Isa. 
45:23, it does not function to shape the moral life o f th e com m unity.
29. See A. Malherbe, "Exhortation in First Thessalonians," N o v u m  T esta m en tu m  25 (1983): 
2 3 8 -5 6 .
30. To understand these terms in their proper co n tex t o f the ancient care o f souls, see  I. H adot, 
Seneca  u n d  die griechiscb-riSm iscbe  T ra d it io n  der Seelenlcitune/ (Berlin: W alter de Cruter, 1969). For the  
m any terms Paul borrows from the G reco-R om an hortatory tradition, see  Fiore, T h e  F u n c tio n , 
1 6 5 -9 0 .
31. For a critique of the view that example implies obedience to an authority, see Fiore, T l x  
F u n c tio n , 45 —100, 164—90.
32 . * Stortz in her chapter helpfully draws attention to the foundation of ethics in perception: 
Action proceeds from the way one imagines the world to be. This insight helps interpret Pauls 
use of the Christ hymn. Paul exhorts his hearers to imagine the world to be as Christ has imag­
ined it— as a place where it is fitting to extend freedom in the divine life to others.
33. Luther's distinction, borrowed from Augustine, between Christ as sacrament and example 
is pertinent here, see Lectures on  H ebrew s (1518), L W  29 , 123-24,- Lectures on R o m a n s  (1 5 1 6 —1517), 
L W  25, 3 0 9 -1 1 , "A Brief Instaiction on What to Look for and Expect in the Gospels'' (1 5 2 1 ), L W  
35, 1 1 9 -2 2 0 . H is insistence that the order be first sacrament and only then example captures the 
Pauline grounding of exhortation in narrative.
34. The terms "good," "pleasing," and "perfect" have a long history in Greek philosophy as 
the context of what human rationality seeks to discover and live by. We will see that these 
terms, the first two of which are mentioned again in the following chapters, point to the pub­
lic significance of the church's process of coming to moral decisions.
35. See, for exam ple, J. Fitzmyer, R o m a n s  (A nchor Bible 33,- N ew  York: D oubleday, 1992), 
6 6 2 -6 4 , 6 7 7 -7 8 .
36. For Stoic interest in kingship after Alexander, see B. D . Shaw, "The Divine Economy: 
Stoicism as Ideology," L a lo m u s  44 (1985).- 16 -5 4 . Dio Chrysostom's four orations on kingship 
(O r a tio n s  1 -4 ) are evidence of ideas about rule worked out in the Hellenistic period lasting at 
least through the beginning of the second century of the common era.
37. Paul does not specify  how  the inner life o f the church becom es visib le to  th ose  on the o u t­
side. H e sim ply assum es that it does. In 14:16 he im agines the criticism  by an outsider rightly  
aim ed at som e member's failure to love. In 14:18 Paul is confid en t the on e w h o  serves Christ by  
lov in g  the oth er is acceptable to th e testing  o f human beings in general. Finally in 15:7-1 3 there 
is at least th e im plication that the gentiles' g lorification  o f G od  flow s out o f m em bers o f the  
b eliev in g  com m u nity  w elcom in g  o n e  another.
38. The New Revised Standard Version is very misleading when it translates b a sta ze in  with "tol­
erate." Such a condescending attitude is not present in this verb, which has the sense of "bear" or 
"carry."
39. Rom. 15:4 is yet another instance o f Paul con cep tu alizin g  th e use o f Scripture in terms o f  
G reco-R om an moral exhortation . N o te  esp ecia lly  th e phrase “through th e exhortation  o f the
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Scriptures." T h e  term teach in g  (d id n sk n U a ) should be un derstood  in terms o f th e p ow er o f exam ­
ples to  shape character. T h is  is sim ilar to  Paul's o th er  exp lic it ground ing o f  th e  congregations' use  
o f  Scripture in th e  theoretical structure o f  moral exhortation  in 1 Cor. 1 0 :6 ,1 1 w here th e  usual 
co n n ectio n  b etw een  typ e  ( t y p o s )  and "instilling mind" (n o u tb ts ia )  is m ade. M ost interesting in the 
Rom ans passage is th e  result Paul env isions w hen  Scripture is used b y  th e  congregation: hop e. 
H ere h e  departs radically from th e  ph ilosop hers w h o  saw th e goal o f  m oral exhortation  to  be the  
rational, stable m ind. For him  th e  goal is op en in g  th e  con gregation  to  th e future in w hich  the  
m ind o f  C hrist un ites th e  church.
Chapter 8: The Reform Dynamic
1. * W e share with Reinhard Hutter the problematizing o f modernity. W e do so on the basis o f the 
unsustainability o f the modern world; he questions modernity's notion of "individual freedom . . . 
understood as the fulfillment o f whatever personal desires we might have" and modernity's placement 
of the autonomous human agent— rather than G od with and for us— at the center o f the moral uni­
verse. W e agree with Hiitter and understand the two critiques o f modernity as complementary.
2. Lester Brown, 'T he Acceleration o f History/' S ta te  o f  the W orld  1 9 9 6  (N ew  York & London: W. W. 
Norton), 3 -20 .
3. Robin Wright, cited by Hal Kane in "Gap in Income Distribution Widening," V ita l S igns 1 9 9 7 . The  
Environm ental Trends T h a t A re Sh ap ing  O u r  Future (N ew  York and London: W. W. Norton, 1997), 116. T he  
statistical data are from this page as well.
4 * T he implication that the subject o f Lutheran ethics is a set o f "Christian practices" and a "way of 
living faith" is paralleled in Flutter's contention that the Christian moral life is essentially "the concrete 
social practices w hich allow  us as believers to  em body . .  . our com m union with God" in a "way o f life." 
We differ with Hotter, or com plem ent him, in perceiving a reform dynamic at the center o f a way of 
living the Lutheran tradition. Martha Stortz also addresses the link between faith and practice(s). She 
too sees Christian faith as a "way of life" shaped by and shaping "practices em bedded in a particular 
community of faith" as well as doctrine (Lutheran doctrine and community, in this case). Yet the "con­
tours of the Christian life . , . (and) the characteristics of Lutheran ethics" that she suggests emerge 
from the "practice" of prayer do not seem to be "oppositional and reconstructive," as w e suggest.
5 * T he chapter by Janies Childs demonstrates an instance o f rereading the tradition. W hile empha­
sizing continuity, he tracks how Luther's formula regarding two realms has developed in modern times 
from dualistic thinking to a more united vision of the relationship of love and justice. H e has also reori­
ented the spatial image to accom modate an emphasis on eschatology and its time-orientation. A more 
dramatic instance of returning to the sources with new eyes is David Frederickson's treatment of Paul, 
who has been the biblical theologian for the Lutheran Confessions, theology, and preaching. In his 
chapter Frederickson presents Paul as the facilitator of congregations as proto-democratic moral com ­
munities that, in effect, constitute counter-cultural societies in miniature. Though Frederickson does 
not raise it, a question emerges here. Since Pauline scholarship now presents a very different Paul from 
the source used in the Lutheran Confessions and basic categories o f Lutheran thought, how do we now  
treat those presentations, the Confessions, and that thought? If the Confessions themselves declare, as 
they do, that their own norms are normed by the Scriptures, what do we do when either (a) biblical 
scholarship presents very different norms from the ones the tradition used, or (b) biblical scholarship 
itself offers no consensus about those norms?
6. Cornel West, "Martin Luther as Prophet," Prophetic Fragments (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans; 
Trenton: Africa World Press, 1988), 257. Much of this sketch of Luther's stance is paraphrased from 
West, 257 -59 .
7. John Dillenberger and Claude W elch, Protestant C h ristian ity  (N ew  York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1954), 323.
8. * Childs explicitly poses the dilemma of exercising moral agency with courage and confidence in 
the face o f the ambiguity of human existence and the com plexities of moral choice. Elis assertion that 
the source of moral courage and agency is the assurance o f God's promise in Jesus Christ rather than 
the certainty of our judgments coheres with our sense of Luther's theological linkage of grace and 
Christian practice. In many ways our chapter offers another complementary reply to his organizing 
question: "Flow do we, as Christian people, and as a church, speak with courage and confidence to e th ­
ical issues, even in the most com plex and disputed o f circumstances?"
9. The phrase cited earlier from Dillenberger and W elch.
10. * There is a significant conversation to consider between this chapter and Hutter's. Both address 
the problem of moral quietism and the range of moral concern. Both link this to a "deep fault line"
